THE New Republic

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in the White House

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by Francis Biddle

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Washington Wire .... *T.R.B.*

How do you like living under a constitutional monarch? That's really what the USA has today. Ike reigns but doesn't govern; everybody agrees he is a splendid fellow, there is an almost universal adulation, and he is virtually sacrosanct. This national harmony is nice in a lot of ways. Maybe a constitutional monarch is what we need. A lot of Republicans think so. To meet the delicate problem of Ike's health different GOP expedients are proposed. One is to keep the royal line in the family by nominating Milton Eisenhower. That would keep things comfortably legitimate. Another is more ambitious. Since Ike never worked very hard at the Presidency anyway, it is proposed to make the job still easier and persuade him, and the voters, that he would really be a lot better off vacationing for the next four years in the White House than vegetating on a Gettysburg farm. Desperate Republicans are trying to promote this theory whose essence is that the best rest cure for a coronary is four more years as American Chief Executive.

These notions strike us as comical, and we think they represent a dream phase in the GOP's reluctant adaptation to a disagreeable world. But they have a practical side too. We don't think Ike will run again. But pretending he will represents a holding operation for shrewd Eisenhower-wing leaders till they can get things organized and agree on an acceptable substitute. They know the anti-Eisenhower Old Guard is prancing to go, that Knowland can hardly restrain himself, that the internecine battle will start the minute Ike says "I'm out." So they want Ike to maintain the suspense.

One thing you could say about Truman, he wasn't a constitutional monarch. He stepped right into the Greek-Turkish vacuum, and he stepped right into Korea too, and galvanized the UN. Even when Ike was well he disliked stepping into things, and today it's uncertain whether he even knows that there is an Egyptian-Israeli crisis at all. War is threatened, and we have no President. Queer situation! But the dangers of our singular form of government have been pointed out before, and it's no use repeating them here. On the larger issue of the Middle East, we hardly see how the other powers can pretend to keep Russia out any longer. Doubtless it is reprehensible for Moscow to sell guns to Egypt but the awkward fact is Britain has been selling them arms for years. We should think none of the great powers (Moscow included) could afford to permit a war and that UN action is indicated now with Moscow, like it or not, invited to participate.

The global struggle today isn't in terms of Red soldier vs. Yankee doughboy but rather of ruble vs. dollar. Moscow is extending economic aid to backward nations all over the map. America's economic aid has been simultaneously diminished, from $4 billion in '50 to less than half a billion this year. Stassen tried to keep up the aid and was promptly given another job. Ike replaced him with John Hollister as head of the International Co-operation Administration. And now Hollister has just come back from a foreign survey to tell a press conference with beaming complacency that everything is going fine and that he believes foreign aid can be cut still more. Well, we'll balance that GOP budget even if it means selling the fire hose.

The US Treasury can't afford half a billion dollars for foreign aid. And yet the profits in one year, of one US corporation, General Motors, will be $1 billion after taxes. It isn't GM's fault, of course, if the Treasury skimps in the global struggle with Communism, but GM figures help give us a sense of proportion. Senator O'Mahoney's Judiciary subcommittee is taking a look at the GM phenomenon this week. Adlai Stevenson at Duluth on Oct. 29 remarked that GM's net income, this year after taxes, would be double "the total income of all farm workers and operators in the whole state of Minnesota before taxes." Nobody can deny that GM is efficient. But just how big is too big? With its brains and billions there really seems no end in sight. GM is not limited to autos, it makes everything from steam shovels to refrigerators. It, in turn, is controlled by Dupont which makes everything from paint to dynamite. (An antitrust suit is under way here.)

Voters must really begin to pay some attention to corporate bigness. Another instance is steel. American steel companies are rolling up the biggest profits in history, having jacked up prices last June "to meet wage increases." Workers got 15 cents an hour more, and the steel companies promptly raised steel prices $7.50 a ton (to $132.50) and blamed labor. For United States Steel this meant wage increases at an estimated cost of $104 million; the estimated benefit from the price increase, $188 million. Even Treasury Secretary Humphrey is known to privately regard this price gouge as exorbitant. But now the steel operators are saying prices must still be higher. Why? To supply capital for expansion! In the old days corporations financed expansion by borrowing and by bond issues; now they feel they are entitled to do it out of current profits. National Steel chairman Ernest Weir boasted, Oct. 6, that his company would make the third highest profit in history and then added that "steel prices must be higher" for the reasons cited. The industry can hardly wait for the wage contract to expire next June 30 to blame labor again for another extortionate price rise. Are you likely to read this story of steel and GM in your daily paper? Think of the amount of advertising GM does, and then write your own editorial attacking O'Mahoney's "snooping."

We often think Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) is America's best Senator since George Norris. Still not fully recovered from undulant fever, he is going into the forthcoming Senate fight against the natural gas giveaway bill with the same determination with which he entered the Marine Corps. This fight could split the Democrats and destroy their own "giveaway" attack against the Republicans. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D, Tex.) favors it. He should recall that a similar measure, the Kerr Bill, wrecked the national aspirations of another ambitious Senator—Kerr of Oklahoma.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Jumping the Boundaries of Containment

LIGHTS have been burning late in the State Department since the Soviet Union began playing leapfrog in Egypt, hopping right over allied countries like Greece, Turkey, and Iran which had signed mutual defense treaties to "contain" the Soviets.

And another Soviet leap is in the offing. On November 20 Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Communist Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev will take off from Moscow in a late model Soviet jet plane for a state visit to India (20 days), Burma (5 days), and Afghanistan (2 days). The Soviet leaders will hedgehop over the "line of containment" when they pass beyond Pakistan, which is a member of both the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Middle East Defense Treaty. The Soviet leaders are filling a return engagement for the lavish entertainment they themselves extended Indian Premier Nehru in Moscow earlier this year and to the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu only last month.

These developments have forced a profound reappraisal of American cold war policy, particularly our policy in Asia and Africa.

Ever since George Kennan outlined the strategy of containment in a 10,000 word dispatch from the American Embassy at Moscow in 1946, the United States has sought to hem in Soviet advances through alliances, military aid, and economic aid poured into free countries in the Soviet rimland.

Containment grew out of the fact that all extensions of Soviet power—in the Baltic states, the European satellites, China, Korea, and Indochina—had been into *territory contiguous to the Communist bloc*. The Red Army was always on the border. Always there was an adjoining land base from which to conduct subversive activities. Twice Communist regimes came to power at points far outside the Soviet bloc—in Guatemala and British Guiana—but these were quickly overthrown.

The game of hedgehopping introduces several new gambits, new at least in scope. The Soviets are directing their overtures at neutralist countries beyond the line of containment. One center of neutralism is in the Arab states, particularly Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Another center is shaped like a disjointed finger across south Asia—Afghanistan, India, Burma and Indonesia. A third is the vast colonial belt in Africa.

The prizes which the Russians carry with them as they hedgehop are most often an offer of Soviet arms and of economic assistance, acompanied by Soviet military training and Soviet engineers and technicians. Two years have passed since the Russians began to pave the streets of Kabul, the Afghan capital, and to install the first modern flour mill in that country. A year and a half has passed since the Russians began work on a $93 million steel mill for India. A year has passed since Russia and other members of the Communist bloc agreed to buy up much of the Burmese rice surplus, in return for the delivery of Communist goods. Against this recent history, shipments of an estimated $75 million worth of Communist tanks, fighter planes, and submarines to Egypt, in return for surplus Egyptian cotton is not wholly new Russian policy. The Egyptian approach dramatizes the new Soviet threat only because of the explosive Arab-Israeli controversy.

The Soviets have important resources which they can put into this new game. They have vast quantities of obsolete arms which are unsuitable for their own use in the hydrogen age, but still would fill a purpose in a small conventional war. If these are not given away soon, their usefulness declines.

As resources for economic aid, the Soviet economy is now growing at the rate of six percent a year, yielding both new capital and heavy goods which are badly needed by underdeveloped countries determined to catch up with the advanced countries. If even a small part of this annual increment were channelled into neutralist countries, its volume would be substantial.

Soviet offers of aid do not yet compare in volume to the aid made available by the United States. For example, American aid to Near East countries between Egypt and Iran has exceeded $600 million during the past 10 years. About $60 million went to Egypt since 1952 and some very significant results have been achieved. A third of our Near Eastern aid went to Israel and another third to the relief of Arab refugees driven out of Israel. That leaves $200 million spent for Arab economic development. None of this money went to Syria and Yemen, which refused American offers.

To the neutralist countries of south Asia—Afghanistan, India, Burma, and Indonesia—the US has also extended over half a billion dollars in aid, most of it to India, since World War II.

The high Aswan dam on the Nile, which Egypt is now negotiating with the Soviet Union to build at a cost of more than $1 billion, has been discussed for years between the Egyptian and American Governments. It was the first project requested by Egypt under the American aid program. And the US has given Egypt full backing in seeking the necessary funds for this project from the World Bank.

But there is one hitch. The waters of the Nile which flow into this dam are under controversy with the Sudan and Ethiopia. Until a settlement is reached on water rights, the Bank feels that it is unwise to proceed with a billion dollar investment. The same type of ob-

Next Week

A special issue assessing the qualifications of Adlai E. Stevenson for the Presidency will include an interview with Mr. Stevenson by Michael Straight and recent statements of the 1952 Democratic candidate on key public issues.

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stacle is holding up a similar development scheme for the Indus River, with water rights in controversy between Pakistan and India.

But such disputes may not deter the Russians. The Aswan Dam would increase the crop land of Egypt by one-third, and every peasant in Egypt would know he was beholden to Russian engineers and Russian rubles if that project were undertaken with Russian aid. The dam would also supply 10 million kilowatts of electric capacity, and ensure flood control on the Nile. If a foreign power had built the entire TVA, it could not have gained the preeminent influence over the people of the Tennessee Valley that a foreign power could gain in Egypt by building Aswan.

Calculations like these are prompting serious reexamination of American policy. There are some in the State Department who believe that a major departure should be considered in American economic foreign policy, including grant aid, larger bank loans, and greater incentives to private investment. There are others who are skeptical of economic aid as a diplomatic instrument.

The present administrator of the foreign aid program, Mr. John B. Hollister, recently set off for Asia with the remark that he was trying to help Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey balance the budget, and returned with the confirmation that he thought next year's aid program in Asia could be pared.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has always been luke warm on aid programs and once told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he thought all the aid which was needed could be supplied by private organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation.

Hedgehopping at Aswan may have changed some minds.

Parties in Britain Begin to Look Different

THE CONSERVATIVE'S Autumn Budget has transformed the political atmosphere in Britain. Much more important than all its economic consequences is that it has revived the fighting spirit of the Labour Party and helped to solve Labour's most crucial problem — the problem of its future leadership.

When Butler introduced the first postwar Conservative Budget in 1952 the *Economist* newspaper found it so similar in pattern and inspiration to the previous Labour budget introduced by Gaitskell that it invented a composite figure, Mr. Butskell, whom it used to personify the economic orthodoxy ruling in both British parties. The apparent similarity of its economic policy to that of the Conservatives has been an immense handicap to the Labour Party ever since—and has indeed helped to foster a Utopian extremism in its own ranks. Now, in the words of *The Observer,* Butskell is dead, with profound and immediate consequences to the political development of both parties.

The Autumn Budget emphasizes, as nothing before, the fundamental cleavage between Labour and Conservative. In April, when Butler claimed to see reasons for reducing taxation, he did so almost entirely by cuts in the income tax which naturally benefited the wealthy most, and left unaided the poorer members of the community who do not pay income tax at all. In October Butler has decided that the whole of April's tax reliefs must be recovered. But he has decided to collect this sum not from those who benefited by his spring budget, but mainly from the ordinary worker and his wife. Purchase tax has been increased by 20 percent, and a range of essential household goods has been subjected to purchase tax for the first time.

Simultaneously certain luxury goods have been entirely relieved of taxation. There are to be large cuts in the housing subsidies paid to local authorities, which will also be denied some of the loan facilities they have previously enjoyed. Thus the planned cut in national housebuilding will be mainly at the expense of cheap housing for the working class. Recent increases in the interest rate have failed so far to discourage investment as planned. But rather than return to state control of private investment Butler plans to cut investment in the nationalized industries. The only measure aimed at the richer classes is a marginal increase in the tax on distributed profits which will bring in only £10 million.

Such a budget would have enraged the Labour Party at any time. But to introduce a tough budget now after a soft budget just before the general election seems to the Labour Party an open confession that the April Budget was a calculated trick to deceive the electorate. And in its parliamentary attack on the present Budget it said so many times.

In opening the attack for the Labour Party, Hugh Gaitskell made the best speech of his parliamentary career. In the words of the *Manchester Guardian* the next day, he not only put forward his claim to succeed Attlee as leader of the Labour Party, he established it. He was no less effective in his subsequent radio and television broadcasts on the budget. Indeed, his attack on the budg-

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et, together with his brilliant speech at the Labour Party Conference in Margate, has at last established Gaitskell, not simply as the leader of one wing in the Labour Party, but as the potential leader of the whole. This has inevitably cost him the praise he used to receive from the non-party press in Britain. But not unnaturally, the fact that he is now criticized by the pundits has only endeared him more to the average member of his own party. His apparent aloofness from the party rough-and-tumble had been his most serious handicap.

A rapid and decisive shift to new and vigorous leaders is still the key to Labour's political recovery. But the Budget has also helped to restore the Labour Party's confidence in its fundamental principles and policies. Its belief in fair shares and equality of sacrifice divides it as sharply as ever from its Conservative opponents, as does its faith in discriminating and selective methods of economic control. If, as now seems likely, these issues provide the battlefield on which the opposing parties will contend, British democracy will be the healthier in consequence.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

When Peace Is "Peace"

THE REPUBLICAN slogan "We gave you peace" is potentially one of the most effective GOP slogans for 1956 if only the world will stay relaxed until the voting. This problem of making the world behave for the convenience of the American election campaign cannot have escaped Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, once dubbed by a top Washington correspondent "the most political Secretary of State in half a century."

When the German unification talks at Geneva appeared to be deadlocked last week, American correspondents at the Foreign Ministers Conference reported that official American spokesmen "at the highest level" had assured them there was genuine hope for success and that East-West positions were significantly closer. Europeans were bewildered.

On the ominous Arab-Israeli tension, Mr. Dulles made no public statement, leaving to subordinates in Washington the responsibility for saying that the situation was far more serious than the State Department had supposed. These are trying days to be a political Secretary of State.

The UN—Back-Scratching on Membership

CANADIAN sponsors of a move to admit 18 new members to the United Nations before the end of the current Assembly are optimistic. They have good reason to be. All the great powers continue to have objections to one or more of the 18, but none of them is willing to shoulder the responsibility for prolonging the membership stalemate.

The United States continues to doubt for example, that Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Outer Mongolia are "peace-loving states" "willing and able" to carry out Charter obligations. It realizes moreover that admission of these states at this time will be used by their satellite regimes as further proof the West is prepared to live with the status quo. But what can Mr. Dulles do when the greatest pressure on him to go along with all 18 is coming from Catholic countries? This is the case because high on the deadlocked list are such Catholic countries as Austria, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Symptomatic of the Catholic attitude was the declaration by Dr. Urrutia of Colombia that the Lation American bloc hoped "all 18" would be admitted.

The Russians also have problems. They were ready to vote for 16, but they are most reluctant to include Japan before signing a peace treaty with that country, or Spain before establishing diplomatic relations with it. One of the tasks of Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson in Moscow was to persuade the Russian leaders it was 18 or none and that to block Japan would mean incurring the wrath of the Bandung powers.

As for Britain and France they are none too eager to swell the ranks of the anti-colonials in the Assembly. Admission of the 18 will mean that for the first time the anti-colonial coalition will be able to muster a two-thirds vote. Britain is reported to be reconciled to the inevitable but France is still arguing the matter in Geneva. However, France is scarcely in a situation where she can use the veto.

Since the US in the past has piously denounced "horse-trades" on the membership issue, one of the tactical problems confronting the Canadians is how to ensure the admission of all 18 without making it seem to be a package deal. The key lies in the fact that the US has always opposed the use of the veto to block the admission of new members. Soviet applicants were kept out instead by preventing them from getting the seven votes needed in the Security Council. (Admission is effected by decision of the Assembly upon recommendation of the Council.) Fortunately for Mr. Dulles a Senate resolution opposing the use of the veto in the admission of new members was passed at the instigation of Senator Vandenburg.

The procedure that is being considered, therefore, is to have the Assembly request a favorable report from the Security Council on each of the 18. This will enable the US in good conscience to say that in not voting against Outer Mongolia in the Council, for example, it is only abiding by the Assembly's majority vote.

Action on this matter is going forward both at the UN and in Geneva. At the UN the affair is chiefly in the hands of Canada and India—two countries, incidentally, that are found teamed up on many issues.

Admission of 18 new members will make it imperative to enlarge various organs of the UN—the Security, Trusteeship and Economic and Social Councils—to permit balanced political and geographical representation. This aspect of the matter is believed to be under discussion by the foreign ministers at Geneva involving as it does changes in the Charter which in turn require the concurrence of the permanent members of the Security Council. There already is talk about India being given a permanent seat on an enlarged Security Council and certainly the colonial countries are going to want an understanding that any enlargement of the Trusteeship Council will not place them at a greater disadvantage than at present.

While diplomats doubt that moves to amend the Charter can begin before 1956, they are likely to be effectuated quickly once they are initiated. That is why a Western draft resolution introduced Nov. 4 that would postpone until 1957 the decision as to when a Charter Review Conference shall be held is viewed as shelving the Conference.

JOSEPH P. LASH

United Nations

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Cairo—Soviet Gateway Into the Middle-East?



by Ray Alan

THERE are known to be two undoubted Marxist sympathizers in the Cairo junta — Deputy Premier Gamal Salem and Intelligence chief Mohieddin — and two other probables. Colonel Abdel-Nasser himself has been greatly influenced by Mr. Nehru's neutralism and was favorably impressed at Bandung by China's Chou En-lai. But the main factor which decided Egypt's present *rapprochement* with the Soviet bloc was the Western "intrigue" —as the junta saw it—with Iraq, her rival for leadership of the divided Arab League.

Colonel Abdel-Nasser dare not, in the prevailing regional and domestic-Egyptian atmosphere, risk either losing control of the League or being outdistanced by Iraq, militarily or diplomatically. Western officials, irritated by the junta's non-co-operation, had spoken rashly —in private, but such things have a habit of getting around—of the desirability of building up the Baghdad régime if only to "teach the Egyptians a lesson" and "show Nasser what a fool he's been." The junta decided that Egypt would do the teaching and showing.

Moreover, with Egypt's mercurial city mobs wearying of military dictatorship and again lending an ear to covert Wafdist and Moslem Brotherhood propaganda, a shot of nationalism and a spectacular series of foreign policy coups were to be recommended. Fresh skirmishes on the Israel frontier would rally both Arab League and domestic support; acceptance of the "commercial transaction" proposed by Russia, and given specific shape last July during the visit of Mr. Shepilov, editor-in-chief of *Pravda* (and a likely future Soviet Foreign Minister), to Cairo, would slap the West in the face and further delight Arab nationalist opinion, besides augmenting both Egypt's military strength and her regional bargaining power. For good measure, the junta would give Britain, the more vulnerable and more unpopular Western partner, a thorough propaganda pasting and co-ordinate its efforts with those of the Saudi Arabia authorities, also angered by the West's Iraqi policy.

The rest of the story is current news. Egypt has already taken delivery of her first cargo of minor Czech supplies and is awaiting the arrival of 100 Soviet tanks, 200 Migs, a small number of submarines and motor torpedo boats and a small party of Czech technicians. She has invited Czechoslovakia, over Britain's protests, to join an international control commission to supervise what will, in effect, be the liquidation of British influence in the Sudan —though Egyptian aspirations there, too, look like being disappointed. She has stepped up her pressure on the Israel frontier. She has concluded with Syria and Saudi Arabia military pacts directed against Iraq as well as Israel and strongly condemned in Whitehall as "more likely to endanger than strengthen" regional security. Egyptian propaganda is again supporting anti-British elements in Kenya, Aden and The Hadhramaut. The junta's advice was decisive in inclining Yemen to sign a new treaty of friendship with Russia.

Saudi Arabia, for her part, is lavishly subsidizing anti-British circles in Jordan, Syria and British-controlled territories in Arabia and along the Persian Gulf.

THE news of the Egyptian-Soviet deal broke just four years after the Western powers' abortive invitation to Egypt to join them in founding a Near East defense organization. In the interval, Messrs. Dulles and Eden had both visited the region, and with their officials had probably devoted more attention to it, per head of its population, than to any other segment of the non-Communist world outside Germany. Four years is generally time enough for any board of directors to show whether they are likely to enrich their shareholders or ruin them. What has been wrong with Western policy that it should pay such appalling dividends?

The basic Western policy debate began in 1946 when the British Labour Government, elected the previous year, had to choose between two alternatives in the Near East: (1) its Indian policy of genuine national and political liberation—the transfer of power, in other words, to representative, liberal, reformist-minded groups; or (2) pursuing a traditional policy of, on the surface, appeasing the nationalism of the ethnic or linguistic majority (if necessary at the expense of local minorities such as the Assyrians, Kurds and Jews) while keeping as firm a hand as possible on the economic and political controls by means of military treaties (as in Iraq and Egypt); discreet understandings with local oligarchies

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(Iraq, Egypt and various Arabian sheikhdoms) and sometimes an element of economic dependence (Jordan and, more recently, Libya). The latter course was favored by the more plausible permanent officials on whom Foreign Secretary Bevin was from the outset dependent —Bevin had in any case little time for the anti-colonialist socialist intellectuals headed by Sir Stafford Cripps who inspired Labour's Indian policy—and this was the policy which carried the day.

ACCORDINGLY, Britain's war-inflated propaganda machine in the Near East began to play to the nationalist gallery while diverting attention from the economic and social problems which comprised the submerged nine-tenths of the nationalist iceberg. Arab and Egyptian reformers and would-be trade-unionists, inspired by British Labour's program, discovered to their dismay that, far from aiding them, Britain's representatives were advising the local governments to clap them into jail. As an angry sense of betrayal and frustration grew on the socio-economic front, the British-godfathered Arab League's professional xenophobes began to run out of targets and—inevitably—turned their fire on ubiquitous Britain herself.

The collapse of British policy at a time when Soviet expansionism was threatening Turkey and Persia forced America to adopt an active role in the region. She at once found herself forced to choose between basic alternatives broadly similar, though in a changed context, to those which had faced Britain in 1946. Should she put her faith in reform, democratization and long-term economic development of the kind foreshadowed by "Point Four", and risk short-term instability, or content herself with short-term economic palliatives and attempt to purchase stability by bolstering up the existing régimes, not always eager to co-operate in reform programs, with military aid?

It was probably inevitable that the latter course should be chosen. The Cold War had by then become too intense for any Western government's military advisers to favor long-term measures. The accent everywhere in the Free World was on rearmament and defensive groupings to meet the possibility of sudden aggression.

Washington had been considering for several months how best to extend NATO's protecting arm into the Near East when, in 1951, tension between Britain and Egypt reached an explosive pitch and the Wafdist government decided unilaterally to abrogate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Whitehall panicked, and rushed the State Department and Quai d'Orsay, against their better judgment, into jointly — naïvely — inviting Egypt to help launch a Near East defense organization. The invitation was rejected with contempt. There can scarcely have been a dozen articulate Egyptians between Alexandria and Aswan who did not regard it as just another imperialist scheme to maintain British troops at Suez—and it may now be admitted, four years later, that this was roughly the limit Whitehall set upon its value.

But the die was cast. A pact had been proposed, and a pact of sorts was what, at all costs, there now had to be.

But to secure it, Western policymakers apparently found it necessary to alienate almost every Arab leader outside Iraq, to widen the rift within the Arab League, to throw the anti-Iraqi wing of the League into Russia's embrace, and incidentally to undermine Israel's security. As a direct consequence, the Near East is today more than ever a "quivering morass"—in the phrase of the *London Economist*—of strife, mistrust and anti-Western agitation.

The fundamental error which the Baghdad pact epitomizes lies less in its inadequacy than in its irrelevance to the real problems of the Near East. Strategically, the Near East is today a backwater, and every new H-bomb and intercontinental bomber produced underlines this fact. On the other hand, its economic importance to the West—in peacetime as well as war—is continuously increasing. Its oil output soared from 16 million metric-tons in 1938 to 90 million in 1950 and 130 million in 1954. Ninety-five percent of Western Europe's oil requirements are now met by the Near East.

The principal danger facing the West is not the theoretical one of losing what T. E. Lawrence called "a sideshow of a sideshow" in a problematical future war but that of finding itself *in peacetime* on the losing side in the region's internal socio-economic struggle.

UNDERLYING all the agitation and ferment in the Near East is the desire of its peoples for a foothold in the twentieth century; for liberation from conscienceless oligarchies which treat their respective territories as private rackets; for the better life an equitable handling of oil royalties could help ensure; for the equality of opportunity and social services both Western and Soviet propagandists are perpetually preaching about. The virus of these desires is spread every time US Information services issues a pamphlet on the American way of life; every time the BBC tells its Arabic and Persian listeners about Britain's free health service and public housing estates; every time American oilmen set out with their equipment to drill a new well.

Once Western policymakers give serious attention to such problems they need have no fear of the Kremlin. For its part, the Kremlin seems fairly obviously to be following the classical power-political line of (1) embarrassing the West wherever possible by exploiting the West's own blunders; (2) confirming our policymakers in their errors by the age-old trick of pretending to be annoyed by them (its mock indignation over the Baghdad pact, which is already provoking far more insomnia in Washington than in Moscow, was a typical example of this); and (3) eating every apple the West drops into its lap.

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A Man with Southern Connections

by Robert L. Riggs

WHEN the astonished Democrats found that Harry Truman's coattails had delivered them a Congressional majority in January, 1949, they feared they had acquired a second wild man on the Senate side. To say that they welcomed Hubert H. Humphrey with restraint would be putting it mildly. They found a seat for him not far from that occupied by Glen Taylor, who had just completed his adventure of running with Henry Wallace on the Progressive Party ticket.

But here it is almost seven years later, and Humphrey is flourishing like the green bay tree. Glen Taylor is long forgotten, having been defeated in one Democratic primary and knocked off four years later by a Republican in a year when a Democrat should have carried Idaho.

Humphrey, by contrast, not only survived his Democratic primary and defeated his Republican opponent in a fight for re-election in 1954, but is sitting firmly in the lap of the Senate's leadership. Instead of flirting with off-brand political movements on the left fringes of his party, Humphrey is a key man in the fight to win renomination for the eminently respectable Adlai E. Stevenson. Whereas Taylor listened to the siren song of a Vice Presidential nomination by the Progressive Party, Humphrey can, in his dreams, hear the Democratic convention in Chicago next summer cheering him as Stevenson's running mate.

You have to rub your eyes a bit to remember that steaming summer night in 1948 when Hubert Humphrey almost single-handed drove the South Carolina delegates from the Philadelphia convention. You have to remember the fiery, 37-year-old Mayor of Minneapolis shouting at the convention. You have to remember his success in persuading the delegates to throw away the double-talk brought in by the platform committee and to substitute for it an unqualified demand for civil rights legislation.

If the expected had happened, if Thomas E. Dewey had won, none would have received greater blame than Humphrey for destroying the Democratic Party, for bringing the Dixiecrat Party into existence.

How, then, can this be the same Hubert Humphrey who occupies such a strategic position in his party's Senate leadership? Can this be the man from whom Lyndon Johnson seeks guidance on liberal issues? Can this be the man about whom Walter George speaks so warmly? Or has a gullible Senator from Minnesota been seduced by the honeyed tones of sharp operators from the land of magnolia blossoms and sweet talk?

The verdict returned by those most likely to be hanging judges when liberals go on trial is that Hubert Humphrey has not retreated one inch from the liberal side while establishing a beachhead among the Southern conservatives. They find that, far from being captured or entrapped by the right wing of his party, Humphrey has bored from within to give liberals a means of presenting their demands to the leadership.

If there is a liberal here and there who feels that Humphrey has yet to induce Lyndon Johnson to move out of Texas on civil rights proposals, that skepticism is not shared by the pressure groups interested in bread-and-butter issues. The political arm of the American Federation of Labor gives strong indorsement to Humphrey's Senate record. The people who put down the black marks and the white marks for the records of the CIO give Humphrey a perfect score card. Americans for Democratic Action, which he helped found, still approves him. So do spokesmen for the liberal-minded American Veterans Committee.

Humphrey's own analysis is that, aside from being seven years older, aside from having seven years experience as a Senator, aside from acquiring such maturity as the passage of time and his own intellectual development provide, he is the same man he was that night in Philadelphia.

Where people make their mistake about him, Humphrey believes, is in casting him in the role of a political wildman. In his view, he never was a wildman, just an ordinary rank-and-file old-fashioned Democrat like his father before him who had been a state legislator and a mayor in South Dakota. That civil rights plank he got the convention to adopt, he says, was nothing more than President Truman had been advocating for years.

As for driving the South Carolinians into the Dixiecrat Party, Humphrey feels they had intended to march out of the convention anyway because they hated Truman. He just gave them an excuse.

"I talked to my father about what I should do at the convention," Humphrey says, "because I knew he was a loyal, old-line Democrat. I told him I didn't want to do anything that would hurt the party. He said go ahead with the substitute plank, because the South

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Carolina delegation had already made up its mind."

Of course, the term "old-line Democrat" means one thing in Minnesota and quite another in Georgia and Mississippi. It was, therefore, not strange that it was a long time before the Southerners felt at ease with their fellow-Democrat. Humphrey himself estimates that it took three years for him to become a full-fledged member of the club.

ONE thing that helped him was the fact that he had no trouble with the problem of Communism, an issue which has proved tricky for some liberals. No Senator on either side of the aisle has been able to shout more vigorously against the Reds than has Humphrey. The Minnesota Democratic-Farmer Labor Party had undergone its struggle with the Communists long before the problem had been felt in some other places. The issue had been met squarely and the party cleansed of Communists. He could never, in 1948, have been caught in the foolish adventure which trapped Glen Taylor.

A second factor in winning his way into the club was his ability to talk without tiring, without seeming to be in reach of a terminal facility. Southerners such as Richard B. Russell got to joshing Humphrey about his capacity to speak forever. The Georgia Democrat professed to be distressed that a Senator with such capacity was on the wrong side of the civil rights issue. It was a pity, he insisted, to waste such talent.

Such facetiousness paved the way for better human relationships between the Minnesota liberal and the conservative wing of his party. What drew him and Walter George together was that, like so many Northern New Dealers, he was in complete accord with the foreign policy views of the Southerners. Hence, when the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee survived the first shock of having the Minnesota left-winger assigned to him, he was glad to welcome another internationalist-minded member. Their mutual admiration has even been extended to fiscal matters. While George can't bring himself to underwrite all the tax schemes to which Humphrey subscribes, the Georgian at least gives him credit for doing his home work and listens patiently and with respect to his views.

But this meeting of the minds actually results from a deliberate policy pursued by Leader Lyndon Johnson and Senate Whip Earle C. Clements. Their policy, both during two years as a minority and one year as the majority party, has been intended to make brothers out of all Democratic Senators. The high strategy is Johnson's, a strategy which has led to accusations that he would rather have harmony than have a group behind him which could achieve a legislative program.

The backroom work of getting the Strom Thurmonds and the Hubert Humphreys of the party to be nice to each other lies in the field of Clements' special talents. Jointly, the two leaders chose Humphrey for the 15-man Democratic Steering Committee. But while that is officiai recognition that the Minnesota Senator is a man whom the leadership delights to honor, it is not a true measure of his influence. It's his unofficial post of liberal adviser to Johnson which gives him his greatest influence.

In theory, at least, Humphrey is the man who presses upon Johnson and Clements the views held by Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Wayne Morse, Richard Neuberger and Patrick McNamara. Sometimes, in the long stretches of the night, Johnson dreams that the entire liberal Democratic bloc has issued an ultimatum that he call for the enactment of an FEPC Act.

During such nightmares, he is likely to cry out to Humphrey: "You keep your bomb throwers off me."

Scarcely anyone, of course, believes that Humphrey is ever going to get Johnson lined up behind a civil rights legislative program. The Minnesota Senator himself stubbornly insists that the day will come when the Southerners will accept the inevitability of such a program. But, in the meantime, it serves as a powerful weapon to force Johnson into a more liberal position on other issues.

It is an interesting experiment to see how long Humphrey, who holds college degrees both in pharmacy and in political science, can stay in favor with both the Southern conservatives and the Northern liberals.

His chances are enhanced by the fact that, even while wearing the badge bestowed by leadership, he has reserved to himself the right to disagree with Johnson on any liberal issue that comes before the chamber. He is strengthened also by the fact that Johnson and Clements know he will never give his support to any surprise attack upon them, would never advocate any program contrary to theirs without giving warning.

And, while none takes too seriously his chances to be nominated for the Vice Presidency, he will inevitably attain stature in the Senate if Stevenson wins the prize, because he is one of the few Senators to take the field early this time for the 1952 nominee.



Senator Hubert Humphrey

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

DURING *India's struggle for freedom, the Congress Party* led by Gandhi and Nehru was a sprawling political umbrella. Under it rallied diverse elements with little in common but their opposition to British rule. Independence brought secession of the Congress left-wing and the formation of a Socialist Party. Old friends of Nehru, the Socialist leaders hoped to build a democratic opposition to Nehru's Congress regime.

Now, eight years after Independence, the Socialist banner hangs tattered from the crossfire of Congress and Communist cannon. Dissident Socialist Rammanohar Lohia this month launched a rump party dedicated to a "more militant" opposition to Nehru. The Socialist split could mark the beginning of the end of India's experiment in party politics—a polarization between an ever stronger Congress and a growing Communist opposition.

In this angry article, G. S. Bhargava, a news editor of the *Times of India* and a leading Indian Socialist pamphleteer, voices partisan disenchantment with a Nehru to whom he has until now remained friendly throughout eight years in the loyal opposition. Bhargava here speaks for both camps in Indian Socialism. *The New Republic* publishes his critique as a significant index of changing opinion in one section of Indian political life. A rejoinder will appear in a subsequent issue of *The NR*.

"Uncle Nehru"—A Critical Portrait

by G. S. Bhargava

"MEN LIKE Jawaharlal, with all their capacity for great and good work, are unsafe in a democracy. He calls himself a democrat and a socialist, and no doubt he does so in all earnestness, but every psychologist knows that the mind is ultimately a slave to the heart and that logic can always be made to fit in with the desires and irrepressible urges of man. A little twist and Jawaharlal might turn into a dictator, sweeping aside the paraphernalia of a slow-moving democracy. He might still use the language and slogans of democracy and socialism, but we all know how Fascism has fattened on this language and then cast it away as useless lumber."

That was Indian Prime Minister Nehru on the subject of Nehru. This introspection was in the form of an anonymous article, published 18 years ago. Nehru, then president of the Congress Party, was being pressed to continue in office for another term. Unwilling to do so but unable to resist the pressure of his colleagues, he wrote that article dissuading Congress Party men from re-electing him to that high office, and warning them that too much pampering might go to his head.

Like his proposal last year to lay down the prime ministership and the leadership of the ruling party, the article had exactly the opposite effect. Nehru himself must have anticipated it. But the significance of the 1937 article was that Nehru, like several other observers, then saw in himself a conflict between the head and the heart —the former given to appreciation and acceptance of the democratic way of life, and the latter, a longing for personal glory and power. George Slocombe put it in a different way when he called Nehru "an agnostic Lenin meekly obedient to the precepts of a Christian Tolstoy" (Gandhi).

No doubt, many Western observers regarded Gandhi himself as a dictator. In a way it was true, but his dictatorial influence was undoubtedly of the benevolent type. He could not have controlled Jawaharlal had it been otherwise. Religious by disposition, the Mahatma could not, even if he wanted, get over the Hindu virtue of humbleness and modesty. He was, on any reckoning, a thousand times more popular than Nehru; he had also more than once toured India from shore to shore. But there was in him no touch of a triumphant Caesar, sweeping through the country like a hurricane. He was more the savant on pilgrimage, begging rather than demanding that justice be done to the untouchables, imploring rather than commanding that nationalism be enshrined in people's hearts. By temperament and upbringing, as well as in demeanor, Gandhi was unsuited to dictatorial imperativeness.

Nehru, on the other hand, was chiselled to be a

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Robespierre. Born with a silver spoon in his mouth, he knew only to command, not to carry out the orders of others. Western education banished from his mind any oriental tendency to make things and men sacrosanct, to accept them without questioning and to demean himself before so-called supervisors.

Success came to Nehru comparatively easily and early in life. At the time of his first imprisonment he was a national hero. He did not, like Gandhi, suffer unknown and unheard of in jails peopled by criminals or ruled by the haughty custodians of law and order in South Africa. Nor was he compelled, like the younger Socialist leaders, Narendra Deva and Jayaprakash, to put up with police torture which made physical wrecks of them both.

The "meek, destructive Gandhi," though he saw to it that there was no revolt by Nehru against his saintly authority, never tried to mold the latter in his image. He never demanded that Nehru accept his ideas on non-violence or decentralization of power. He did not seek to make another Mahatma of his political heir; he had even, perhaps deliberately, allowed the commissar in Nehru to lie in wait, ultimately to replace the yogi when Gandhi was gone.

As long as Gandhi was alive, there was no danger of an omnipotent Nehru. But the moment an assassin's bullet took the Mahatma's life, there was a vacuum within Nehru as well as the country. It was the commissar who gained supremacy in Nehru's heart, while in the country at large the void persisted. Idolatry of Gandhi as Father of the Nation could not long fill the void; the nation began to need a new father. Whether a politician could fill that role or whether only a Mahatma could do it was the question.

At first Nehru assumed that only a moral authority of Gandhi's stature could fill the political vacuum. He felt that in the absence of such a spiritual magnet people would be drawn to Communism which, in addition to its promise of a fuller life, also provided emotional rewards. In the light of developments in China and Tibet, Nehru saw the spectacular Communist victories in South India in the 1952 elections as something more than a local urge for speedy social change.

His visit to China last year provided answers to Nehru's questions. The one-leader, one-party system seemed relevant to problems confronting India, making unnecessary a Mahatma. By the magic of propaganda a leader could be built up as a super-Mahatma, one who did no wrong and who was incapable of nothing. But the people had to believe in him implicitly, carry out his dictates without question and feel happy about it. They would have to be fired by a vision of a great country they would be helping to build.

In Russia, a few months later, Nehru saw what China might achieve by the one-leader, one-party system. The pattern was the same. Government demanded and got absolute obedience. All else was subordinated to the task of national reconstruction and development. People put up with hardships, sweated long hours without protest and willingly paid heavy taxes. Capital was thus accumulated primitively and the country industrialized.

Opposition, the pillar of Western democracy, was a luxury in these countries striving to lift themselves up by their bootstraps. True, individual liberties were not much in evidence, but they did not matter vitally when the more important issues of life and living were at stake. The present generation, perhaps the next one or two also, would suffer, but it was all for the good of posterity.

These ideas are as old as totalitarianism, but they appeared in a new light to Nehru. He was convinced that the path of China, with variations, was the path for India.

Nehru is, however, too shrewd to suggest that the democratic apparatus be scrapped. In this respect he has improved upon the Chinese technique. Outwardly nothing is done to disfigure the democratic form of India. After all, Western observers are more particular about the form than the content of democracy. They will still regard India as a bulwark of democracy in Asia, as a democratic competitor with totalitarian China.

Therefore, Opposition in India is not put down, unless absolutely necessary, as in Kashmir. Nor will it be made constitutionally impossible for the Opposition to function, but as many Opposition elements as possible will be "absorbed" into the ruling party. When the Lower House of the present Indian Parliament came into being in 1952, there were about 120 non-Congress members in a House of about 500. Today, the Opposition has no more than 70 members; the rest have joined the majority. In the next Parliament there will not be even 70 Opposition members.

BUT in Kashmir, which is constitutionally part of India, it is different. Opponents, present or prospective, of the regime are first thrown in jail, without trial or sentence, and then branded as "traitors." Nehru himself, in a recent speech in Parliament, chastized the Socialists for collaboration with known "enemies" of India in Kashmir. He referred to a group of dissidents from the ruling party who demanded a plebiscite for Kashmir's future. And the crime of the Socialists lies in seeking to extend democratic rights, guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, to an Indian state.

India's second five-year plan, now in the final stages of preparation, is based on the Communist concept of planning. Arbitrarily set targets are established. The stress is on heavy industry, to facilitate the development of which curbs on production and import of consumer goods are envisaged, leading to a high degree of economic austerity, heavier and more regressive taxation and further concentration of economic and political power. Deficit financing, which is also provided for at the rate of 2 billion rupees ($421 million) a year for

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five years, will add to the distress of the fixed income groups by releasing an inflationary spiral.

A parallel between planning in Russia and what is being attempted in India is very significant. The industrial superstructure is to be raised on the foundations of a semi-colonial economy riven by glaring disparities and conspicuous for its social immobility. Between 1931-1932 and 1950-1951, while incomes below Rs. 25,000 have fallen from 81.9 percent of the total taxable income to 65 percent, those above Rs. 25,000 have risen from 19.1 to 35 percent. The sharpest increase has been in the case of incomes exceeding 100,000 rupees, from 3 to 12.9 percent. Yet, to a demand for lessening of income disparities through taxation measures and institutional changes Nehru's reply is that in Russia disparities are used as incentives for progress.

Nevertheless, Nehru is aware of the danger of any of the Opposition groups capitalizing on public discontent. In India, where *satyagraha* or extra-constitutional, non-violent defiance of authority is an accepted form of mass action, the danger is not limited to election periods.

Nehru, therefore, has evolved a new method of dealing with Opposition. It consists of subverting the already divided Opposition, ideologically as well as through baits of office. By his foreign policy of friendliness for Russia and China, he has disarmed the Communists. To add to the dissension he had sown in Socialist ranks by a coalition move with them (the coalition never materialized because the Prime Minister would not allow himself to be pinned down to a definite program), he stole their slogan of a socialistic pattern of society. Today the Praja Socialist Party, which showed promise of being the Labour Party of India, is passing through a serious internal crisis. Even with the right-wing communal group, Nehru has made peace by his attitude to Pakistan and by a promise to accept the Hindu revivalist conception of Bharateeya culture.



Prime Minister Nehru

Simultaneously with his encouragement of polarization of political forces between his party and the Communists Nehru has befriended a section of the Communists themselves. "They [the Indian Communists] are in mental difficulties," he triumphantly told journalists some time ago, during his tour of Yugoslavia. At home, at the same time, Nehru's party men were extending invitations to Communists to join their party. The same panacea is applied to the Sikh trouble in Punjab, which threatens to lead to the carving of a Sikh state on the Pakistan model. Nehru's followers tell the Sikhs: "Join the Congress and power will be yours."

Finally, the legend of an infallible Nehru is being sedulously created. Other countries have equally popular prime ministers or chief executives; but nowhere else do they run the length and breadth of a vast country, receiving receptions, giving sermons, tearing down police cordons (erected at their own instance to keep crowds away) and at the same time losing temper with masses who lionize them. Even the dictators of Communist countries are more frugal than Nehru in their public appearances and speeches. The President of the Indian Union, whose job it is to perform these formalities, is relegated to the background.

During the last eight years there has probably not been a day when the government-controlled All India Radio says nothing about Nehru, either that he has hurt his finger, or that he has received a grand ovation from people shouting "Nehru *ki jai*" (victory for Nehru) at a railway station or an airport, or that some foreign dignitary or journal has praised his role in world affairs. The same accolades are found in the non-governmental press in India. What cannot the author of solutions to so many intricate world problems achieve at home, newspapers ask?

As an apt epilogue to this narrative we can cite a recent instance when the Socialist leader, Jayaprakash Narayan, took exception to Nehru's stand on civil liberties. It all started when the police opened fire on a group of students in Patna. Infuriated at the police behavior, students in two other towns tore down the national flag which was being ceremoniously hoisted on Indian Independence Day (August 15). Linking up the flag incidents (the effect) with the firing (the cause), Nehru roundly condemned the students. He said he wouldn't mind if ten thousand or ten hundred thousand people were shot down, but he wouldn't tolerate dishonor of the national flag.

When the Socialist leader politely pointed out that Nehru was speaking the language of totalitarians, the Secretary of the Congress Party, S. N. Agarwal, replied to him saying that Nehru today "is, in more senses than one, the symbol of national unity and solidarity and symbolizes the aspirations for world peace on the basis of Panch Shila." How could he be guilty of a lapse?

It is an axiom which all rulers over Delhi, from the Moguls onwards, have learned: nothing impresses a backward people like pageantry. These days the Indian capital abounds in State banquets and *mushairas* (performances by poets). While at the former toasts are drunk to the statesmanship of Nehru, his glories are sung at the latter. Since his return from China, where children are in the vanguard of demonstrations, his birthday on November 14 is celebrated in principal Indian towns as "children's day." And that day the Prime Minister is called "*cha cha* Nehru" (uncle Nehru).

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Walter Lippmann and Reality

by Francis Biddle

I DID NOT read Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy* until after I had seen Mr. Archibald MacLeish's outspoken attack on the book and its author's polite but not very crushing rejoinder, both in the last number of the *Yale Review*. What they said represented such divergent views of the contemporary American scene that I was tempted to study the book with a good deal of care. This deep-rooted disagreement might indicate a similar disaccord among Americans, not only over the solutions but about the nature of the problems to which the solutions were directed. The confusions of each seemed to me to run deep. That they were reflected in our society at large was probable. It might be worth trying to disentangle and to present them.

I found it difficult to follow Mr. MacLeish's eloquent but unclear article—"The Alternative." There is no doubt that he was profoundly shocked by what he supposes to be Mr. Lippmann's "ineluctable choice," (particularly as he considers Mr. Lippmann "one of the most perceptive readers of the American mind"), an alternative based on the conviction that "full individual freedom" cannot be reconciled with community life, and that therefore we must abandon "the dream of American freedom" and return to "the form of community with which we have present literary familiarity — the community of the Roman and the Medieval periods." Mr. MacLeish thereupon feels himself compelled to make this choice, as if it were a trap baited for him by Mr. Lippmann, and comes out unequivocally for the "forward dream of freedom," since the "flow of human life is not backward toward closer and closer association but forward toward greater individuality." "Mr. Lippmann's book," Mr. MacLeish concludes, "ends in the sand because he has mistaken the direction of history."

From all of which we may assume that Mr. MacLeish considers himself a "liberal" and Mr. Lippmann a reactionary.

Mr. Lippmann's rejoinder indicates an irritation not unnatural under the circumstances, but he addresses himself good-humoredly to his critic's enthusiastic oversimplification. He suggests that Mr. MacLeish confuses "that boundless liberty which belongs to the inward country of the individual spirit" with the liberty of the "outward country," men's public and political actions, where individual freedom can only be "as great as possible," and must be bounded if we are to make free governments workable. Mr. MacLeish's confusion of the two is symptomatic of the "mortal disease of free societies."

Mr. MacLeish's vision of America does seem to me representative of a great number of his countrymen—"the great, sane, decent, honorable majority of the American people," as he likes to think of them. He deals with the past as if it were neatly cut off from the present and the future, and tells us that we must not "attempt to return to the continent from which we came," but must move "forward toward greater and greater individuality." He is satisfied with the present, although "aware that mass vulgarity afflicts our culture and mass hysteria our politics," and that "one may not like the characteristic art of our epoch." There is much talk of the American dream, and apparent satisfaction with the God of things as they are. Does not this blithe outlook come close to defining the current liberal outlook: or, it might be more accurate to say, the conservative's idea of the liberal's point of view?

MR. Lippmann's outlook, to turn the coin, betrays in his book the unreality of the world in which a small handful of American conservatives live. There is a charm about it, like the shimmering vision of a distant dream country—but it is not our country. Twenty years ago Mr. Lippmann told us of his dream in *The Good Society*. Then he believed that the true function of government was like that of a judge. In *The Public Philosophy* his feeling about government has gathered a new "majesty." But he still believes that the intolerable choice between security and liberty has not yet become inexorable.

Mr. Lippmann insists that our modern society is deeply diseased. This sickness comes, he asserts, from an attempt to govern by public opinion and by popular assemblies, instead of by the chosen executives who alone can govern. Popular opinion always seeks the easy, the soft solution, and when it is dominant, and our governing bodies are elected to act but as its agents, the great, tough problems of taxation, of the extent to which freedom of speech may be permitted, of peace or of war, cannot be solved rationally. The result is the breakdown of government since World War I, when the nations involved surrendered to the mob. Hence dictatorships. If the choice is between being incompetently represented

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or being governed without being represented, the people will always choose authority "which promises to be paternal in preference to freedom which threatens to be fratricidal." If the breakdown in government continues, there is nothing that can prevent that choice from being exercised.

With Mr. Lippmann's conclusion that there is something fundamentally wrong with modern life one may agree without tracing the germ to the breakdown of government, or confining the malady to Western democracies. The malady cannot be explained by showing that democratic principles have been applied where they do not belong. The ills of which he complains are not symptomatic of any particular form of government. They go deeper than government, and are inherent in the entire web of the industrial civilization to which *all* the world is reaching. They are the ills of man's spirit crushed by the impersonal mechanization of his daily life. They are most evident in the Russian orbit where the powers of the state have been frankly used to destroy the roots from which that spirit sucks its life. But they are permitted to flourish in our own country in which a competitive society believes that it must not interfere with the impersonal play of the machine in order to preserve its own inner being. Mankind is sick, but not from the enfeebling of executives under the expanding scope of assemblies dominated by the expanding public opinion of recently enfranchised voters.

Since Mr. Lippmann's diagnosis is chiefly on the political level, we are led to expect a discussion of the effectiveness of the machinery of contemporary governments. He talks sweepingly of modern democratic governments, never, however, differentiating one from another—Switzerland from Denmark, the United States from Great Britain, the United States from France. He rarely gives instances or cites examples—a form of philosophic generalization which makes realistic criticism difficult. But for our purposes (and for his, I think) it may be assumed that most of the time he has American government in mind, and would be content to confine discussion to our own imperfections. Yet, on the American political level, he never touches on such urgent considerations as the constitutional separation of powers. He might answer that such details are unessential to his larger purpose. But the separation of powers is a fundamental democratic contrivance, and affords opportunities for those irresponsibilities of popular government which he so properly deplores. He is convinced that modern democratic governments lack power, but does not say whether he would favor attempts, by constitutional change or legislation, to give the President greater powers and make the popular parties more responsible. Nor is there any discussion on the international plane of the effects of conferences at the "top level," dating from the time when Mr. Lippmann asserts "the institutional framework of the established governments broke" down.

Mr. Lippmann then applies a philosophic and moral solution for his political difficulties. He does not tell us how to cope with the evil of an encroaching legislature, or the growing feebleness of the executive, or state whether he favors a more restricted franchise, greater curbing of "pressure" groups, or an educational system more selective and discriminating. He would revive *natural law,* which is the name by which, he says, the public philosophy has been known. He admits that natural law has always caused great semantic confusion, and then proceeds to add to the confusion. At times it is difficult to disentangle Mr. Lippmann from his authorities, and to know whether he accepts their doctrines as his own: St. Paul—that when our passions are "transformed by allegiance to the other realm of being" we do not need to be disciplined: St. Thomas Aquinas—that there is a sovereign law imprinted in the heart and nature of man; Francis Bacon, who recognizes the two disparate realms of being, with their occasional harmonies in the lives of saints and heroes; Blackstone, who proclaims that "the earth and all things therein" are "the general property of all mankind," thus recognizing that title to the land is in *The People* as a corporate historic community, "which lives on while individuals come into it and go out of it."

I have quoted Mr. Lippmann's spiritual and intellectual authorities (there are many more) at some length to indicate the extent to which he himself leans on them, particularly when he comes to a discussion of natural law. He is certain, and he keeps returning to the refuge of this certainty, that the ills which he finds in the Western democracies cannot be cured unless we re-establish the idea of natural law. Yet he is unable to tell us what it is or where it leads, or separate the various idealizations which have clustered about this tenuous dream since Aristotle first spoke of the absolute good. "There are," Mr. Lippmann states, "certain principles which, when they have been demonstrated, only the willfully irrational can deny," and "certain obligations binding on all men who are committed to a free society, that only the willfully subversive can reject." But he never specifies what those principles and obligations are, except to repeat that they are the principles of right behavior in the good society. He suggests that the *jus naturale* of the Romans was the law imposed on mankind by common human nature, and that the highest laws are those upon which *all* "rational men of good will" will agree, but he does not otherwise describe these gentlemen.

He concludes that to communicate the public philosophy to the democracies there must be a doctrine, yet beyond doctrine are those concepts and principles "which have their being in immaterial entities." These essences and abstractions, which cannot be experienced or "imagined in visual or tangible terms," must yet be made concrete.

The failure of Mr. Lippmann's argument is not merely

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in the vagueness of his conceptions. His failure is that they bear no relation to the world in which we live, or to the problems of statesmanship which he raises. Mr. Lippmann tells us that "free institutions and democracy were conceived and established by men who adhered to a public philosophy." But I doubt whether the men who founded our country took natural law very seriously. It is true that in the Declarations and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (October 14, 1774) there is talk of "the immutable laws of nature"; but the phrase is coupled with "the principles of the English Constitution," and the claim that Americans are "entitled to all the rights, liberties and immunities" of English subjects. These are spelled out. Nine months later the Declaration of Independence speaks of "the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God" entitle a people. But the rest of the document is a detailed indictment of specific wrongs suffered at the hands of "the present King of Great Britain." The signers were determined, as they said, to lay the foundations of their government "on such principles . . . as to them" seemed most likely to effect "their safety and happiness." They were interested in re-establishing in America the free system of English laws. It was to be expected that at such a tremendous moment of time they should appeal to the popular myth of natural law.

Natural law over the centuries has been invoked to defend both sides of many a burning issue. Both the Federalists and their opponents conjured it to strengthen their positions in the fight over ratification of the Constitution. Natural law during the years immediately before the Civil War was appropriated not only by the Abolitionists but by the slaveholders, who contended that "God and Nature had decreed slavery as the price of civilization." More recently the Catholic Church has declared that birth control is against the law of nature. But Mr. Lippmann endeavors to restore its universality, not to further any particular cause, but as an end in itself. Without it, he thinks, the world is lost. The sin of Jean-Paul Sartre is not only that he has done away with God, "but with the recognition that beyond our private worlds there is a public world to which we belong."

But the history of the development of public institutions in the US has never, as I have suggested, been affected by the dogma of natural law. The American temper has on the whole tended to distrust such absolutes, to be skeptical and tolerant, to be anti-clerical and pragmatic. Toleration, Mr. Lippmann says, is possible only where there is no vital threat to the community, and is not therefore a sufficient principle for dealing with the existing schisms—"we have gone beyond the limits of accommodation." Yet we have been ultimately tolerant in our moments of greatest crisis—Grant at Appomatox, Lincoln in his dealings with the seceded States.

It cannot be denied, however, that the conception of an absolute justice inherent in nature, and discoverable by man, is not without splendor. If the dream cannot be defined, it nonetheless has had its place in the growth of civilization, like other myths. But it no longer moves men to action, and therefore lacks the vitality of inner vision. Mr. Lippmann betrays an awareness of this when he admits that a rereading of Aristotle and Burke "will not give the answers to the immediate and concrete questions."

And the liberties which Mr. Lippmann would revive by restoring the authority of older times have none of the static quality of moral absolutes. The issues of freedom and of security shift and change, and take on new color and light, even as the human beings change who have evolved and prescribed the rules, over the long, passionate years of *human* struggle and *human* sacrifice. To root his hard-earned rights in the nature of man himself is as moving a conception as to derive them from the incommunicable authority of man's Creator.

That Mr. Lippmann should describe himself as a liberal is hard to understand. His instincts and emphasis are those of a conservative in the best sense of the word—his feeling for the necessity of symbols and myths as guides for human beings; his belief in the majesty of great government; his reverence for the heroes of the human past, and for the traditions which we have inherited from them, and have now set aside; his hatred of the secularization and anonymity of modern government; his insistence that the mass can give or withhold consent, but cannot govern; his sense of the need to draw on prescription, prerogative, and consecration—these are the marks of the true conservative, of Burke, and of John Randolph of Roanoke, and of old John Quincy Adams. This conservative leadership is greatly needed to restore the awareness of the continuity of the good earth and of men's relation to it, lost in the modern worship of business, or vulgarized in the sentimentalities which would have us return to the class conscious society of the old South. Mr. Lippmann is deeply troubled about the modern men who are *of* but not *in* the community they live in. They are indeed lost in the lonely crowd, uprooted from the earth to which they once belonged, fed by the banalities of radio and television, and on the gadgets which our day and age supply with such ruthless enthusiasm.

So I find myself in closer agreement with Mr. Lippmann's diagnosis of present conditions than with Mr. MacLeish's conviction that the evidence of the contemporary arts—the only "dependable evidence of the condition of the human soul in any age"—proves that the human journey "has never pressed on so urgently toward individuality and individual freedom." I can only wish that Mr. Lippmann, who so sincerely feels the need of restoring our roots, will some day translate his vision into more human and more concrete terms.

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

The Superficial Aspect

The Invisible Man

Was Ike ever there at all?

The question is legitimate now that his absence for full six weeks has had no perceptible effect on the conduct of public affairs. The stumbling of Mr. Benson, the fumbling of Mr. Dulles and the bumbling of Mr. Nixon have undergone no change. The absence of the President seems to have affected nothing except that the hitherto Invisible Man has now become faintly discernible. The country is becoming vaguely aware of the existence of Mr. Sherman Adams.

So the question inevitably arises, who has been holding the Administration together all this time? Obviously, not Eisenhower, or his sudden removal from the controls would have been felt long ago. His prestige has been an effective cohesive force, without doubt, but a man's prestige may be employed by others to very good effect if the man consents. Over and over again Eisenhower's prestige has been used to pick up Benson, to prop up Dulles and to shut up Nixon and the public has supposed that Eisenhower was using it. But now a doubt arises.

The more astute Republican politicians are already beginning to sit up and take notice. Recently two or three of them have included Adams' name in their lists of possible successors to Eisenhower, and if things continue to run smoothly it is likely that more and more will eventually see the point. The Indispensable Man is not altogether a myth; some leader is indispensable, and if the one so identified suddenly disappears without noticeable effect, the mythical element evidently was the identification, not the leadership.

Perhaps the revelation will come through the agency of the Near East crisis. As Dean Acheson pointed out in the November *Harpers,* the Administration's foreign policy has so far been coasting on the momentum inherited from its predecessor. Only in Indo-China has it been called upon for initiative and resourcefulness, and there it flopped completely.

But the situation in the Near East has taken a twist that could not have been foreseen, hence the plans that Truman and Acheson laid out have become obsolete as far as that part of the world is concerned. The grand strategy is unchanged, but new tactics must be devised to meet the new situation. If the Republican Party has any leadership other than that of Eisenhower, it must show it now, and show it quickly.

Acheson's deadly suavity touched its apogee in one passing remark in that *Harper's* article. It was his observation that for the past twenty years the great asset of the Democratic Party has been "its hospitality to intelligence." On its face the statement looks blandly innocent, even trite in view of the massive evidence that supports it. The sting is in calling hospitality to intelligence an asset which it could not be if the opposition maintained the same attitude.

Well, we shall soon know. The Near Eastern crisis, after all, is the same kind of thing that we faced successfully from 1945 to 1952 — it is a continuation of the constant probing of Communism searching for the weak spot in the free world's line of defense, a repetition of its effort in Greece, in Turkey, in Italy, in Berlin and in Korea. None of those efforts succeeded — but each was defeated by a different form of counter-thrust. Arms and money in Turkey, arms and military advice in Greece, food in Italy, the airlift in Berlin, the Marshall Plan throughout western Europe and military force in Korea threw back the menace, in each case by means skillfully adapted to that situation.

In Indonesia the Administration could not find any means adapted to that situation, and Indonesia almost went down the drain. Now the Near East is slipping, and the question is, has the Republican Party been hospitable enough to intelligence to have now the ability to out-think the Communists as successfully as its predecessors did? If the Near East goes, the answer is bound to be in the negative.

On the other hand, if the Near East is saved by some quick-witted move on our part, then Ike becomes very definitely the Dispensable Man, and skeptical outsiders will begin to wonder if he ever was more than the imposing front behind which the real operators managed the government in his name. "King George," remarked Joe Choate, "does not reign, he only sprinkles." It would be an ironical twist of history indeed if Sherman Adams, most faithful of assistants, should now save the situation by some brilliant *coup* of statecraft. If he should do so he would indeed deserve well of the country; but by the same token he would inevitably convert his chief into the Great Aspergillum, the instrument, but not the source of such blessings as we may receive.

It is a possibility but not, one fears, a probability. Ike is not there. Now some people begin to think that Ike has never been there. The crisis is thundering at the door; is nobody home?

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Challenge of the Post-Geneva World

by Adlai E. Stevenson

I FIRST saw Chester Bowles about 40 years ago at preparatory school. I wish I could say that I detected then the qualities which have given his later career such distinction. But all I recall is that he was the best golf player in the school. And since then, golf is about the only field in which he has not distinguished himself. First in the advertising business, then as head of the Office of Price Administration, later as the imaginative Governor of Connecticut and (in one of President Truman's most inspired appointments) as Ambassador to India, he has displayed a consistent vigor, humanity and enlightenment. His new book, *The New Dimensions of Peace,* now presents his mature reflections about the challenge confronting the United States in the post-Geneva world.

The New Dimensions of Peace, by Chester Bowles (Harper; $4.50).

The new Soviet leaders, in Mr. Bowles' judgment, have recognized the bankruptcy of the tough Stalin policy of intimidation and aggression. For the foreseeable future, he believes, the Russians will play for relaxation and coexistence. In consequence, he writes, "we may be facing an unparalleled change in world relationships." But Americans can by no means regard the new situation with complacency. "The new Russian strategy may turn out to be more revolutionary and more dangerous than anything Stalin ever envisioned." As the danger of a shooting war recedes, the contest will be more sharply focussed than ever on the competition for the under-developed and uncommitted world. And in this contest, where our history, tradition and ingenuity should have equipped us to do so well, we have, in fact, Mr. Bowles suggests, done very badly—and must begin very soon to do better.

The bulk of the book is devoted to an account of the three twentieth-century revolutions which have changed the face and the future of the Eurasian land mass. Two of these revolutions—the Russian and the Chinese—have already been captured by the Communists. If they capture a third—the wave of unrest and hope sweeping over South Asia and the Middle East (to say nothing of Africa and Latin America)—then the free world may well despair. *The New Dimensions of Peace* is a cool but eloquent warning to the West to make contact with the revolution of the under-developed areas while there is still time.

In the competition for this revolution, the Communists, as the copyright-owners on modern revolution, would seem to enjoy an advantage. But Mr. Bowles believes that the American Revolution still has a relevance in the twentieth century, and that, properly applied, it can bring peace and abundance to the world in a way which Communism never can. But, to apply it, we must rediscover our own revolutionary traditions. As we rediscover these traditions, we will begin to understand what we understood so well in 1776—that the dollar and the gun, however mighty they may be, are trivial next to the power of ideas, of faith and of understanding. "Man does not live by bread alone," Mr. Bowles writes. "He desires justice. He desires independence. He desires brotherhood."

The essential fallacy in American policy through the last decade, he feels, has been "our excessive faith in military strength and our failure fully to understand what dynamic ideas can accomplish when keyed to the aspirations of frustrated and hungry people." Perhaps primary concentration on military policy was essential from 1945 to 1955. But, in the face of the new Soviet line, it may become disastrous. Mr. Bowles does not, of course, mean that we should reduce our armed strength; indeed, he wants it to be maintained; but he does not want it to be the heart and soul of our policy. He quotes Admiral Mahan: "The purpose of military power is to provide time for moral ideas to take root." And in the post-Stalin era, he contends, our relations with the uncommitted peoples will depend even less on the weight of our nuclear stockpile and even more on the ability to understand how people think and feel, what they want and what they fear.

What we must do, Mr. Bowles suggests, is to hold the strategic line against Communist military aggression, to draw together the non-Communist world in a broad area of economic and political cooperation and to induce a rate of economic growth sufficient to discourage internal subversion. If we can sustain these policies long enough, "then a new generation of Communist leaders may decide to accommodate theory to facts." From his experience in India and his travels to Africa and Asia since, Mr. Bowles appends a wealth of concrete suggestion as to how we can conduct our foreign policy with more warmth, sympathy and understanding, and how we can project a more appealing and more faithful image of the United States.

IT seems to me that Ambassador Bowles has summed up in this book many of the essentials of a genuinely democratic and affirmative foreign policy. My dissents from him are only a series of footnotes and emphases. This is avowedly a non-political volume; and I must confess my feeling that at times Mr. Bowles has leaned pretty far backward in his anxiety to be nonpartisan. Many individual Republicans, of course, deserve full credit for their support of a positive foreign policy. But my suspicion is that historians, while recognizing the continuity of much of American foreign policy over the last decade, will also note certain sharp changes in tone and manner since the advent of this Republican administration in January, 1953. The militarist emphasis which Mr. Bowles so strongly condemns has been stepped up sharply of late, while constructive impulses of the Point Four type have nearly faded away. Similarly, when he discusses the degradation of the American image abroad, he could have accurately observed that the administration's efforts to collaborate with McCarthy and his friends had much to do with the decline of our national reputation.

Still, while the optimism and buoyancy of the book occasionally may appear to gloss over some of the frustra-

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tions and agonies of this troubled age, they reflect at the same time the mood of tempered confidence in which the challenge of our time can be effectively met. In his preface, Mr. Bowles mentions as the great obstacle to a wise policy the "frightening gap" between what most foreign policy experts think we must do and the information that reaches the people. The gap has not been closed, he suggests, because too many of our political leaders have been selling the American people short — have been feeding them pap and stereotypes instead of talking sense about the appalling complexity of our age. Mr. Bowles, one can safely say, does not sell the American people short, and *The New Dimensions of Peace* should be a major contribution to the closing of the gap. It is a wise, practical and magnanimous work, and it reflects the spirit which an affirmative American foreign policy must incarnate.

Religion Without Faith

by Nathan Glazer

RELIGION in America today presents a strange and interesting paradox. The "religious revival" is, from some points of views, a reality. Church membership is rising, vast sums of money are spent on church building, there is a remarkable delicacy in all public references to religion (and it seems clear, further, that for some time to come American Presidents will have to be churchgoers), and there is even a growing and respectable literature about religion in America. And yet it is hard to believe, after all that has happened in the past 500 years, that we are about to see another great age of faith.

Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology, by Will Herberg (Doubleday; $4).

Perhaps it is naïve to consider religion without faith—which in a word is the situation we have in America today—a paradox; yet once we accept the fact, as I think every serious observer must, that simple (or even complex) faith is not the major mover in the current religious revival, we are left with the question, what is?

Herberg finds the answer in the history of immigration, in particular in the history of the relatively recent, non-English-speaking groups (those that have come here since the Civil War.) In general, he asserts, following the distinguished American historian of immigration, Marcus Hansen, one will find that the first generation of immigrants—that is, the immigrants proper — cling strongly to the language and institutions of the old country, and perhaps most strongly to the church.

The second generation, in its desire to become Americanized, and in its embarrassment over its link to the low-status immigrant groups, tends to divorce itself from the immigrant culture, abandoning the immigrant language, refusing to join the immigrant associations, and becoming lukewarm in its attachment to the immigrant church.

The third generation, however, often takes a much more sympathetic attitude toward the culture and religion of the original immigrants. In part, this is because its Americanization is insured, and it no longer feels embarrassed by foreign accents or inflections, or lower-class turns of speech; nor does it any longer feel any doubts about its right to "belong." It can afford to take a more tolerant attitude toward the remnants of difference which still persist. But more important, Herberg suggests, is that the third generation discovers that America is subdivided into communities, and that, despite ideology, there is no such thing as simple, 100 percent Americanism. The term "100 percent American" generally means a white-Protestant-American-who-has-been-here-long-enough-for-it-to-be-assumed-that-his-ancestors-came-from-the-British-Isles. And not being able to become a member of that group, the third-generation American often feels the need to re-join, or re-create, a group with which he can identify. The point is crucial for Herberg's argument, and I give it in his own words:

> The third generation . . . really managed to get rid of the immigrant foreignness, the hopelessly double alienation, of the generation that preceded it; it became American in a sense that had been, by and large, impossible for the immigrants and their children. That problem, at least, was solved; but its solution paradoxically rendered more acute the perennial problem of "belonging" and self-identification. They were Americans, but what kind of Americans? They could not be simply "shapeless integers of a homogeneous mass. . . . They wished to belong to a group." [The quotation is from Oscar Handlin.] But what group could they belong to? The old-line ethnic group, with its foreign language and culture, was not for them; they were Americans. But the old family religion, the old ethnic religion, could serve where language and culture could not; the religion of the immigrants—with certain necessary modifications, such as the replacement of the ethnic language by English—was accorded a place in the American scheme of things which made it at once both genuinely American and a genuine principle of group identification.

Herberg adds later:

> The only kind of separateness or diversity that America recognizes as permanent, and yet also involves no status of inferiority, is the diversity or separateness of religious community.

This explanation, while it seems in certain respects strained, does fix neatly certain important historical facts. Thus, while we might expect this third-generation return to an Americanized church to be evident throughout American history, its influence would be obscured, while immigration was at the flood, both by second-generation indifference and by first-generation adherence to a hardly modified ethnic church. With the cutting off of mass immigration in 1924, however, conditions were set for the third generation to become numerically dominant, and for its nostalgia to become an important element in American religious life. One might see, in terms of this explanation, a 'twenties and 'thirties in which second-generation indifference and antagonism was at its height, and a 'forties and 'fifties in which a rising third generation return made itself felt most markedly.

SINCE the church is thus playing largely a social role, supplying a presumed need for belonging or identification, one can see why faith need play no large role in the present religious revival.

But this to be sure is only a partial

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explanation. What about that one-half or more of the American population in the old Protestant churches whose forebears came here so long ago that the "third-generation effect" can play no role? Certainly the religious revival also affects this group? They are influenced, one would gather from Herberg's analysis (as are, too, the third generation) by another factor—that of a kind of "other-directed" conformity (he uses the terminology of David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd*) or adjustment to prevailing middle-class norms—and these norms prescribe some kind of religious identification. Once again, we have a kind of social-psychological support for religion which is independent of faith.

We saw above that America recognizes that religious difference (as long as it is within the framework of the Bible, one might add) involves no inferiority; now we see that, more than simply *tolerating* religion, some element in American culture directly prescribes religious identification as a norm of middle-class Americanism. Herberg quotes President Eisenhower: "Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith —and I don't care what it is." America prescribes religion: but it does not care which one. Herberg brilliantly analyzes this remarkable religion of religion, in which the object of faith, or belief, is not God as such, but rather the utility of faith or belief itself. There has thus been created an Amercan religion—though I think Herberg exaggerates the extent to which all branches of American religion take this position in favor of contentless belief. The Catholics, at least, will have little to do with this American religion.

Herberg's argument has a certain architectonic grandeur, and while one may peck away at one point or another, the whole, I believe, stands as the most satisfactory explanation we have yet been given as to just what is happening to religion in America. I do feel, however, that one important support on which the structure rests has not yet been filled in in sufficient detail. We have seen how the third generation has been brought to a position in which (1) it wishes to be American and (2) it wishes in some way to maintain an identification with its past, and the argument is that religion supplies both needs. We have seen too how a general desire for conformity leads Americans to accept some kind of religious identification. Further, since religion is supported by these social needs—for identification or conformity—the content of each religion (Protestant, Catholic or Jewish) does not emphasize the specific dogmatic elements of each faith, but rather the efficacy, social and psychological, of religion in general.

But just what is it that makes Americans insist on considering religion an important part of Americanism? So important, indeed, that the third generation—which is often made up of children of a very naturalistically-minded second generation—sees *religious* identification as a necessary part of Americanism, and so important that the other-directed American finds he must conform to a norm of religion rather than irreligion? Certainly at times in Ameri-

The World, the Times

THE HABIT of these years is constant choice.
Each act, each moment is political.
Enormous power responds to one man's voice.
The president and cabinet are on call.
Great freedom walks in us, and we command
The universe forever to expand.

The world, the times, the country, and the age
Manoeuvre toward eventuality.
We wait the coming; maybe in a rage
Great conquerors will come, our leaders be,
To take the generations into war
Until we men and women are no more;

Or maybe at some Easter we will find
A martyr who by absence wins the earth,
Who walked in life before us who were blind,
And Whom we will await in second birth;
So live in holy darkness, and be sure
Our souls if not our bodies are secure.

However may the future be disguised,
I praise the moment, when no world is made.
Anarchy works to kill the civilized
And nothing will prevent a mortal raid
Except defense with violence again
Within the minds of many single men.

Now men are Persian in their ease, and fling
All difficulties out, for the freed man
Believes no good or ill in anything,
But loves his minute's pleasure, or what can
So glorify his days that they will be
Productive of his own security.

There's no security except the grave;
There's much belief in what does not exist.
All that is excellent is hard to save,
Since every man is partly anarchist.
We live by choice, and choose with every act
That form or chaos move from mind to fact.

I name an age of choice and discontent
Whose emblem is "the difficult to choose."
Each man is free to act, but his intent
Must circumscribe what he may not refuse.
Each moment is political, and we
Are clothed in nothing but mortality.

DONALD HALL

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can history in the past, the tide seemed to be running in the other direction, and it seemed reasonable to foresee an America in which one would conform to a norm of rational agnosticism, and in which the third generation would satisfy its needs for belongingness in secular organizations with only a general and rather vague ethnic character.

THE history of the third generation helps explain something—but only in the light of a pre-existing norm which takes religion, even without faith (and perhaps *particularly* without faith) as some kind of *sine qua non* of full Americanism. It is this part of the story that Mr. Herberg has not yet told.

This odd staying power of religion in America (and not only America) is not an easy thing to understand, yet all explanations of the religious upsurge in terms of recent factors alone (like the third-generation, or depression and wars, or even the shift to "other-direction") are in large measure unsatisfying until we do understand it. A review is not the place to go into this matter in detail, yet a few suggestions may be hazarded. I suspect that, as in so many other spheres, the years between 1880 and 1920 marked a decisive change in the character of American religion. (Protestantism is of course the issue when one speaks of American religion). The last decades of the nineteenth century marked the end of revivalism and the faith of the Puritans (even in its various transmuted forms) as a serious force in American life: from that time on no religious leader was also a leader in American intellectual or spiritual life. The campaign of Bryan in 1896 was the last event that possessed some of the quality of the great revivals that had, from time to time, shaken and revitalized Protestant religion. By the time of the Scopes trial, no one could take the old-time religion seriously; and no one has since.

The situation today is that, insofar as religion is popular, it has no specifically religious content emphasizing, that is, faith, dogma, theology, and insofar as it has religious content, it is not very popular, and limited, in large measure, to intellectuals. Religion, which at the turn of the century seemed to be dying, was saved because, for various reasons, it became useful for social reasons. One of those ways in which religion became useful, is that it helped define excluded groups. And at a time when America has, so to speak, settled down, when frontier towns had become middle-class communities, and cities had begun to spread out into suburbs, this matter of a relatively fixed and defined social hierarchy, which involved a definition of excluded groups, became a problem in American society. Along with these developments, respectability became a central value in American society, more important than it is in Continental Europe or even England. The swearing, blaspheming male, who had to be dragged off to the opera and the church, disappeared. First he became a joke, then part of folklore, and then simply improper. The male now goes to the opera *and* to church.

It was in the context of this discovery of the social uses of religion, and of the rise of the value of respectability, that, I think, the factors on which Herberg lays stress—the third-generation return, and other-directed conformity—could become important, and could create the kind of religion he has described so well. From the point of view of someone interested in the revival of an authentic religious faith, a real dependence on God, these social factors are ambiguous: they do not form proper motivations for religious life, but they keep religious institutions and forms alive, and make it easier, perhaps, for real faith to exist.

Whether the present flourishing religious institutions and forms, which have only a distant, historical relationship to an authentic religious faith, can yet become imbued with a deep and profound religious sentiment is an open question, for Herberg and for any serious thinker about religion in America. I myself believe the terrible wounds suffered by religion in the past 300 years, primarily because of the spread of the scientific world view throughout society, cannot be healed. Religion, which was once a belief for the everybody, and a matter of policy for the elite, has changed its character. Today faith is only possible for the sophisticated, who can explain—or explain away—the implications of modern science and scientific thinking. The majority, regardless of what they say on public-opinion polls, can no longer be deeply affected by religious faith. For them, henceforth, religion will be a matter of social utility.


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MUSIC

IN *Troilus and Cressida,* Sir William Walton confronts and successfully solves most of the problems traditionally posed by opera. Without in any way attempting to escape the conventions of his medium, he has written a work in the grand manner which compares very favorably with the best works of the

Troilus and Cressida, by Sir William Walton (New York City Center production).

romantic literature, to which it bears a family resemblance. Since the operas of Benjamin Britten and Gian-Carlo Menotti belong to the same family, it's not unfair to mention that the Walton work is much more effective in terms of dramatic action, melodic invention, and entertainment than anything we have yet heard of theirs. Walton seems to work on the assumption that, in an opera, the singing comes first, and then the show. He is not at all concerned with the possibility of establishing complex characters or psychologically involved states of mind. His Troilus is not a repressed homosexual and his Cressida is not incestuously involved with her father; they are, rather, a hero and a heroine who fall in love, make love, and die. While it is not simple, his plot (drawn by the librettist, Walter Hassall, not from Shakespeare but from Chaucer) is no more than a variation of the classic star-crossed-lovers situation. Black villainy and Fate conspire to bring the lovers down.

If by choosing to put stock characters into a standard situation Walton has taken an easy solution to the subject-matter problem, there is some question as to whether there is any other solution. If there is, Britten and Menotti have not found it. It is true that the Verdi and Puccini operas seemed much more like realistic theatre to their first audiences than they do to us. But in that nineteenth-century audiences were much more willing to accept the make-believe than we are, the establishment of the illusion of reality was easier than it is now.

For it has yet to be demonstrated that an operatic character can assume more than a symbolic relation to reality, if for no other reason than that a person singing with an orchestral accompaniment is in such an artificial situation that no one could mistake it for the real thing. If a composer can bring himself to accept this fact at the outset, it becomes an asset.

The whole world knows that vocal technique and acting talent are rarely housed in the same body, and that the body housing a good voice is not always appropriate to the parts in which the singer finds himself. The old jokes about fat Madame Butterflies aren't as pointed as they once were, since modern operatic sopranos make a business of slenderizing, but the men still get fat, and the acting problem hasn't changed much. For the recent New York staging of *Troilus,* the City Center hired Margaret Webster to cheer up the production by handling the stage direction, and also John Boyt, who provided handsome, functional sets. But what would you do if you were Margaret Webster and they gave you a leading lady who couldn't execute the slightest gesture with authority, or a leading man whose conception of stage business consisted of raising and lowering his left arm? You would probably do just what she did: dress them in pretty costumes, walk them on, walk them off, pose them on different levels, give them some simple business, and hope.

The composer's job, under such circumstances, is to provide what somebody—I think it was Norman Lloyd—called "mickey-mousing": to support every physical gesture with such a hullaballoo that it seems bigger than it is. Walton's score is surely one of the most elaborately mickey-moused pieces of music in existence. Every gesture is motivated and sustained, and the simplest entrances and exists are accompanied by a clatter from the battery that would be appropriate to an army on the march. At the climax of the second act, Walton pulls off a *tour-de-force:* he sends Troilus and Cressida to bed behind curtains, lowers the stage lights, and turns his orchestra loose for several minutes in a passionate, tender and completely abandoned *Liebesnacht.* Only a secure composer would attempt such a device, tricky under any conditions and doubly dangerous since Shostakovitch tried it and failed so miserably, twenty years ago, in his *Lady Macbeth of Mzensk.* In *Troilus,* this interlude (which, in less skilled hands, could have been so embarrassing), is not only right: it is proper, it is profoundly moving, and it is the climax—the *dramatic* climax—of the piece.

It is right as a climax not only because it is well-written and well-timed, but because it occurs at a point in the opera when we have stopped fussing about what is or isn't factually true and are left believing only what we wish to believe: in this case, that there is such a thing as absolute good, and that idealized love is real. Such a topic may be more appropriate to soap opera and grand opera than to our spoken theatre, but it's still something in which most people like to believe, once the bars are down. And, at this point in *Troilus,* the bars give way; all disbelief is suspended; we become our ideal selves.

Listeners familiar with Walton's earlier vocal music will be surprised at the wealth of sung melody in *Troilus.* Though the orchestration is heavy, brilliant and typically Waltonian, the piece is a singer's opera, in that the orchestration never gets in the way of the singing and always supports it so that the most taxing vocal feats sound both virtuosic and effortless. More important, it is a listener's opera, full of luxurious and expansive tunes cast as arias, duets, and finally a gorgeous sextet.

The only important flaw is the libretto, which Mr. Hassall tailored to Sir William's needs and which, as literature, won't bear even the slightest scrutiny, reminding us of the old saw that what is too silly to be said is sung. But it serves as a fine hatrack and leads one to believe that Walton, by interpolating a few stage directions, could transform the Sears-Roebuck catalogue into a work of high art.

ROBERT EVETT

Notes on Contributors

NATHAN GLAZER is a sociologist, an editor of Anchor Books, and a frequent contributor to American periodicals. DONALD HALL'S first book of poems, *Exiles and Marriages,* will be published later this month by the Viking Press. The Academy of American Poets has chosen it as the Lamont Poetry selection for 1955. ROBERT EVETT'S essay on Gian-Carlo Menotti appears in the current issue of the *Kenyon Review.*

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A Psychiatrist Comments

The Numbers Game in Neuroses

With this column, *The New Republic* begins a new series of articles. They are addressed to the non-professional layman interested in psychiatry's contribution not only to mental health, but to our understanding of politics, sociology, the arts and the law.

Dr. Henry A. Davidson was formerly Chief of Program Development in the Psychiatry and Neurology Service of the Veterans Administration; he is now Assistant Superintendent of the Essex County Overbrook Hospital in New Jersey and a contributing editor to *Medical Economics*. Subsequent columns will be written by Dr. Don D. Jackson, Visiting Psychiatrist at the Palo Alto Hospital and Clinic in California; Dr. Norman Reider, Chief of the Psychiatric Division at Mount Zion Hospital in San Francisco; and Dr. Ian Stevenson, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the Louisiana State University School of Medicine.

More beds are devoted to mental disease than to the care of all physical disorders put together. This kind of statistic is the backbone of mental hygiene lectures. The statement is technically correct, since, in round numbers there are about a million hospital beds in the country, and some 600,000 of them are in mental hospitals. All medical, surgical and obstetrical conditions together account for 400,000 beds; psychiatric disorders alone account for 600,000.

The problem, however, is not bed occupancy but disease incidence. Here the figures as given don't mean much. Even in terms of hospital usage they don't mean much. The average stay in a general hospital bed today is 8 days; in a state hospital (psychiatric bed) three years. So look at it this way: Here is a bed in a state hospital. At the end of three years it has accommodated one patient. Here is a bed in a community general hospital. At the end of three years it has accommodated 135 patients.

So, *per bed*, the load is 135 times as great in the general hospital as in the mental hospital. Or to put it another way: in a three-year period there are 600,000 hospitalized mental patients; but there are 54 million general hospital patients (that is, 135 times 400,000).

So the statement about "more than half the beds being devoted to mental patients" is true (that is, not incorrect), but untrue (that is, misleading).

A similar kind of numbers game is played when such statements as these are given out: more than umpteen percent of a doctor's office-load consists of people with emotional disorders or with physical disorders having a strong emotional component. You can write your own ticket for the "umpteen." Any figure is as correct as any other. The snag here is simply this: there is an emotional component in every disease. Whether you have a broken ankle, pulmonary tuberculosis, a sore throat or coronary thrombosis, you will have some kind of emotional response to your disability. Furthermore, this emotional component is no casual by-product. It is a potent factor in your getting well or staying sick.

Any time any one says that there are so many alcoholics, juvenile delinquents, drug addicts or neurotics in this country, ask him to prove it. He can't. Take, for instance, the apparently simple matter of tallying the neurotics. We really have to have this figure—or some reasonable approximation—if we want to calculate how many mental hygiene clinics and psychiatrists we need. Neurotics make up the backbone of the daily work of these two resources. How do you determine the number of neurotics in your city?

In the first place, many of them don't go to doctors at all. They live with their neuroses, maybe they glory in them, and they don't get into any statistics. The bulk of the remainder go to family doctors or general practitioners where the gastric neurosis becomes a chronic gastritis, the hysterically fast pulse becomes a simple tachycardia, the neurotic backache is called a slipped disc. And many are recognized and labelled as psychoneuroses. But this is not a reportable disease, and you'd have to poll every GP in the community to get even a rough approximation.

There are a number of theoretically sound ways of measuring the incidence of psychoneurosis, but none of these have been put into operation on any significant scale. You might, for instance, do a house to house canvass, giving the canvasser a questionnaire form that would, presumably, identify the neurotic. Or you might take a cross section of all the people in a factory, school, military draft, or department store and submit them to psychiatric screening. You might take an intensive if small sample—say of all patients in a labor union health program — and project the sample figure to the larger canvass. But you can see the practical obstacles to any of these projects as well as the scientific uncertainty of any conclusions you might draw from them.

The sad fact is that any one who quotes incidence figures for neurosis, is talking through his hat.

Even so spectacular a social breakdown as juvenile delinquency has a pretty sandy statistical base. If a boy in a slum area breaks a store window, one will get you ten that he'll appear in a juvenile court and become a statistic. But if my son breaks a store window tomorrow you know perfectly well that he isn't going to get on any court docket for that. I hate to believe all these scare figures about the apparent rise in delinquency rates, because these past 30 years have shown the development of (a) child-centered homes, (b) visiting teachers, (c) child guidance clinics, (d) private psychiatric practice (e) modern juvenile courts. If now, juvenile delinquency has sky-rocketed, I would have to conclude that all these things are doing more harm than good. This I refuse to believe. I suspect that the apparent rise is due to the fact that there are a lot more juveniles than there used to be—hence more juvenile delinquents; and a lot more juvenile courts, hence more chances to appear in the statistics. Before a county had a juvenile court, the delinquent was handled by a police sergeant, and never got into the statistics. I think that the courts and probation offices handle them better—but they do pile up the statistics. "Statistics," says Emil Frankel, "is the art of drawing a crooked line from an unproved assumption to a foregone conclusion." HENRY A. DAVIDSON, MD

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CORRESPONDENCE

► International Disarmament

SIRS:

Mr. Bolte's scheme for international disarmament (*NR*, October 24), is logical and symmetrical, but it is a design for the entablature of the Temple of Mankind drawn before we have scraped out the quicksand that lies where we propose to place the foundations.

Armament is a concomitant of tyranny as certainly as plague is of rat infestation. Mr. Bolte would not require any nation to reduce its armed forces below the number required to preserve internal order, which he estimates at the ratio of one armed man to 500 population. That is roughly the proportion of police to people in Baltimore City, and there has been no organized attack on the City Hall within living memory.

But Baltimore lives under government by consent of the governed, and Moscow doesn't. Security for the Kremlin requires more men and heavier weapons than security for the City Hall.

Tyranny must be heavily armed in order to survive; hence liberty cannot disarm while tyranny survives. Tyranny, not armament, is the threat, and reduction of the threat must precede reduction of its effects, one of which is armament.

To rely upon arms to extirpate tyranny is, of course, as foolish as relying on one of its symptoms to cure the disease. Tyranny cannot be effectively eliminated by external pressure. It must be destroyed from within, and not by spies and saboteurs, who are agents of external pressure.

The free nations, especially the most powerful among them, are condemned to the maintenance of heavy armament for just so long a time as it takes the Russian people and the Chinese people to discover the basic fallacy in Communist theory. If that discovery never comes, neither will disarmament ever come, for the one must precede the other.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

Baltimore, Md.

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SIRS:

As to Mr. Bolte's article, I can see nothing radically new in it; his proposals are no more than a rehash of those made by the League of Nations people 20-odd years ago, and in my opinion if adopted would deliver the Western World lock, stock and barrel over to the Communists. The "roots of war" are not armaments, they are the causes of war; the former are the effects of the latter, and their increase and decrease may be compared to a temperature chart which registers the degree of the fever the causes create. There can be no profitable "gateway" or disarmament until the causes of war are eliminated: they are the division of Europe, the division of Germany and the cold war. When Europe is back to her 1938 frontiers, when Germany is reunited, and when in all its forms the cold war ceases, then it will be rational to turn to disarmament; but to do so prior to these things being accomplished is irrational and would be to play directly into the Kremlin's hands.

MAJ. GEN. J. F. C. FULLER

Crowborough, Sussex
England

Editor's Note: Comment is welcomed on practical steps for reaching international agreement on limitation of armaments.

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► Who But Stevenson

SIRS:

I am disappointed to see the *New Republic*, in its issue of October 24th, sniping at Stevenson, both on the TRB page and in your "Behind the Headlines." Stevenson may not be traveling toward the New Jerusalem as rapidly as you think he ought. He may not be playing the game of politics as skillfully as the editors of *The New Republic* would play it if they were in his place. But Stevenson is a great man, one of the very few great men of our time. . . .

BENJAMIN H. KIZER

Spokane, Wash.

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SIRS:

TRB understates Adlai's case considerably. He ignores civil liberties, for example, where Adlai shines and Ike equivocates. When the Illinois legislature enthusiastically passed a loyalty oath bill, Stevenson vetoed it with an eloquent statement of principles which has become classic. He did this when McCarthyism was rampant and when other governors were retreating before the hysteria. In contrast, Gov. Warren opposed the university regents when they ordered an oath for faculty members until the issue got too hot. He then completely reversed himself and sponsored a bill requiring every employee of a city, county, or the state to take a more stringent oath than the regents had proposed. Ike himself told a labor convention that he would be proud to take a loyalty oath daily if everyone had to. . . .

JULIA ROBINSON

Berkeley, Cal.

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SIRS:

I like your paper. But lately I find you are leaning towards the Republican Party. Here is what I want to know. If Adlai Stevenson is the Democratic nominee will your paper support him?

W. A. GAINS

Tampa, Florida

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SIRS:

"Behind the Headlines" finds that between Adlai Stevenson and Averell Harriman the decision "is still in doubt." Rubbish. It will be Adlai Stevenson all the way. . . .

ALLEN KLEIN

Mount Vernon, N. Y.

• • •

SIRS:

The efficiency and wisdom with which Mr. Stevenson governed Illinois, his choice of the best persons to fill important positions regardless of party, his warm welcome by all kinds of people around the world, give promise of the kind of government so needed by the people of this country. . . .

CLARA STURGES JOHNSON

Claremont, Cal.

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